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ABSTRACT. Antoni Domènech (1952-2017) was 
one of Spain’s most important political philo-
sophers of the late twentieth and early twenty-
first centuries. Known primarily as a scholar of 
republicanism, his work on the concepts of in-
dividual liberty and rights complicates standard 
liberal definitions, which he believed erred in 
defining these terms independent of institutio-
nal context, as pre-political attributes of the in-
dividual. He argued that republicanism co-
rrected liberalism’s abstraction by making 
one’s actually being able to exercise liberty 
and rights depend on one’s enjoying a suffi-
ciently robust set of material conditions, or on 
having enough property so that one could al-
ways avoid unequal social relationships.  
RESUMEN. Antoni Domènech (1952-2017) fue 
uno de los filósofos políticos más importantes de 
España de finales del siglo XX y principios del XXI. 
Conocido principalmente como estudioso del re-
publicanismo, su trabajo sobre los conceptos de li-
bertad y derechos individuales pone en cuestión las 
definiciones liberales estándar, que él creyó erra-
das al definir estos términos independientemente 
de su contexto institucional, como atributos pre-po-
líticos del individuo. Sostuvo que el republicanis-
mo corrige estas abstracciones liberales al hacer que 
la capacidad de ejercer realmente la libertad y los 
derechos dependa de que uno disfrute de unas con-
diciones materiales lo suficientemente sólidas, o de 
que tenga suficiente propiedad para poder evitar toda 
relación social desigual. 
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Introduction: Liberal and  
Republican Concepts of Individual 
Liberty and Rights 
 
Since his untimely death in 2017, two of An-
toni Domènech’s fellows, Daniel Raventós 
and César Rendueles, have praised him, re-
spectively, as Spain’s preeminent, “incor-
ruptible republican philosopher,” and the au-
thor of “probably the most important Span-
ish-language essay written yet in this cen-
tury” (2017; 2019).1 Yet, as if to demonstrate 
Joaquín Bartrina’s famous punchline about 
Spaniards’ invidious self-deprecation—“and 
if he speaks ill of Spain, he’s a Spaniard”—
when Domènech died, there was not a cur-
rent edition of the great essay he had pub-
lished in 2004: a historical reflection on how 
the modern world’s attachment to the French 
Revolution’s values of liberté and egalité 
meant an overshadowing of the third one, or 
an Eclipse of Fraternity.2 Though a com-
memorative edition is now back in print, 
with a preface by Rendueles and an epilogue 
by Raventós (Domènech 2019), and though 
Domènech’s oeuvre has inspired notewor-
thy recent publications, this important 
thinker deserves still more scholarly atten-
tion.3 This article aims to fill this void.  
A republican theorist throughout his 
career, Domènech maintained, against a 
widely held view, that the concepts of in-
dividual liberty and rights were properly 
part of the republican (not the liberal) tra-
dition, if these terms were defined ac-
cording to a Greco-Roman idea of citi-
zenship or the “principle of fraternity” of 
Maximilien Robespierre and the Jacobins 
of France’s First Republic, from which, 
Domènech argued, stemmed the later ideal 
of “revolutionary social democracy” of 
such progressive political figures as Marx, 
Engels, and Giuseppe Garibaldi, the left-
libertarian hero of Italian independence 
(2004, 20).4 If liberals, who typically pri-
oritize individual liberty and rights over 
social goods, and thus will defend pri-
marily, with Samuel Warren and former 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Bran-
deis, an asocial “right to privacy,” or “right 
to be let alone,” Domènech understood this 
order of preference to impede the real ex-
ercise of liberty and rights, and so to be 
necessarily wrong (193). From a republi-
can perspective (and here Robespierre’s 
Jacobins are representative), Warren and 
Brandeis beg the question, by ignoring that 
to concern oneself with individuals’ pri-
vacy is to presuppose that they possess the 
material means to exist independently in 
society. Rejecting this assumption, 
Domènech frequently alludes to Robe-
spierre’s position that “the primary social 
law” is not to let people alone, but to 
“[guarantee] the means of existence to all 
society’s members” (Robespierre 1965, 
53). The most important individual right 
is to exist, which should not be assumed, 
but (in a spirit of fraternal solidarity) 
legally guaranteed by ensuring that ev-
eryone possesses what Domènech, bor-
rowing from one of Raventós’s major 
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works, called “the material conditions of 
liberty,” the most important of which is 
property (2007).  
Domènech claims that liberalism, due 
to its overriding commitment to the rights 
of property-owners to own property (rather 
than to individuals per se), has a checkered 
history in terms of defending individuals, 
and particularly those without property. 
His position resembles the proposition 
with which Marc Mulholland opens his 
book on this uniquely Bourgeois Liberty. 
Property-owners are “abstractly attached 
to civil and political liberty,” but “tend to 
become more illiberal in reaction to the 
rise of the working class” (1). However, 
Domènech’s argument rests not only on 
historical claims about the political actions 
of propertied classes, but on a logical im-
plication of liberalism—if it is true, in ac-
cordance with Jan Narveson’s blunt, clas-
sical liberal claim, that “liberty is 
property,” or that, as Gerald Gaus wrote 
more subtly, “since at least the seventeenth 
century, liberals have not only understood 
liberty and property to be fundamental, but 
to be somehow intimately related or in-
terwoven,” then the question of what lib-
erals have to say about the liberty of all 
people, including, of course, the property-
less, has no obvious answer (66; 1994, 
209). Challenging Narveson and Gaus, 
Domènech does not equate liberty and 
property, but holds that “freedom actually 
derives from property [or] from the ma-
terial independence of individuals” 
(Domènech and Raventós 2007, 1). Thus, 
while Narveson and Gaus take liberty as 
granted and make the accumulation of 
property a rightful expression of it, 
Domènech’s liberty, though a fundamen-
tal right, can only be realized if one has 
enough property not to depend another. 
Advancing a specifically republican the-
ory of rights and the preservation of indi-
viduals’ political liberties as tools for ad-
dressing such current challenges as 
economic inequality, Domènech, together 
with Raventós, has advocated for a uni-
versal basic income: a means of guaran-
teeing everyone’s right to existence, in 
what Domènech called Robespierre’s and 
the early-French Revolution’s “revolu-
tionary-democratic tradition of 1792” 
(2004, 109).5  
To more clearly distinguish Domènech 
from liberalism’s approach to individual 
rights, further clarification is needed, for it 
may seem strange to identify Domènech, a 
left-wing political thinker, with individual 
rights—often associated with liberal eco-
nomic conservatism. Surely, Domènech is 
no (conservative or neoliberal) individual-
ist, who might, like Margaret Thatcher, raise 
a copy of Friedrich Hayek’s Constitution 
of Liberty to accompany an extremely anti-
social creed, such as the former British 
Prime Minister’s controversial claim that 
“there is no such thing as society,” only “in-
dividual men and women [and] families” (in 
Evans 86). For Domènech, Thatcher—in a 
way that is typical of liberalism and anti-
thetical to republicanism—wrongly con-
ceptualizes “individual men and women” as 
one, undifferentiated category, and thus says 
nothing of socio-politically relevant dis-
tinctions between them, such as their rela-
tive access to wealth, property, or, more ab-
stractly, levers of economic or political 
influence. Thatcher’s omission invites a con-
trast with Marx and the republican tradi-
tion to which Marx was indebted. While the 
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individuality of Thatcher’s “men and 
women” is to be understood, a-socially, as 
what Domènech calls—bringing to mind 
Martin Luther or, more recently, neoliberal 
Robert Nozick—an inwardly-focused ‘self-
ownership,’ Domènech says that Marx made 
individuality, or “the development of indi-
vidual personality” depend not on one’s iso-
lation from society, but on access to “a so-
ciety’s productive base” (1989, 332).6 This 
relative relationship between individual and 
society forces a conclusion that is opposite 
to Thatcher’s: only the proper configuration 
of society can enable individuals to actually 
enjoy the right to personal development that 
liberalism asserts but fails materially to guar-
antee. In terms of Domènech’s notion of re-
publican individual rights, whether the so-
cial configuration is Marx’s communist one 
is less important than the conceptual insight 
that reverses Thatcher’s assumption about 
naturally self-sufficient individuals who, at 
least as far as their freedom is concerned, 
have no need of society.  
Domènech often stressed Marx’s debts 
to the republican tradition. Marx’s idea that 
a society’s prevailing mode of production 
will condition individuals’ social lives was 
a radically democratic version of an orig-
inally conservative republican idea that 
dates to classical Greece. For Aristotle, 
one’s having the means of social subsis-
tence was a necessary condition for polit-
ical virtue and, therefore, for the exercise 
of citizenship. His Politics distinguishes 
between (1) individuals with enough ma-
terial wealth to live without working, 
whom he supposed to be the best citizens, 
and (2) those who, subject to the will of 
others because of their insufficient wealth, 
are unfit for citizenship. Aristotle did not 
hide his scarce faith in the latter group’s 
capacity for virtue; not having the wealth 
that is essential for full republican citi-
zenship, they must work, or “perform nec-
essary tasks for an individual,” and, in so 
doing, are “slaves” (72-74). If they “per-
form [tasks] for the community,” then 
Aristotle calls them, variously, “vulgar 
craftsmen” or “hired laborers,” both of 
which categories, like that of slaves, entail 
a deficient capacity for virtue.7 Domènech 
generalizes this idea to encompass all an-
cient political philosophy, including “Ro-
man law,” which, in Domènech’s words: 
 
Never conceptually separated the ‘abs-
tract’ or ‘formal’ problem of persons 
that are legally free or sui iuris (and of 
their capacity to develop civic virtues) 
from the, as it were, ‘concrete’ problem 
of the institutional and material bases 
on which their freedom, autonomy, and 
virtue as persons rested; that is, from 
the problem of property (both personal 
property and, most of all, landed pro-
perty) (2004, 42).8 
 
As Domènech argues, if “the essence” 
of republican liberty is that the individual 
should exhibit “no dependence [. . .] upon 
other persons,” and if disparate access to 
what Domènech calls “personal” and 
“landed property” means property-owners 
can realistically aspire to classical republi-
can liberty as independence, while the prop-
erty-less cannot, then the republican tradi-
tion portrays society more accurately than 
liberalism, if liberalism is understood to as-
sert an equality that, given the ubiquity of 
unequal social relations, does not really ex-
ist (1989, 332). For Domènech, this pref-
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erence holds whether one refers to republi-
canism of a conservative (e.g. Aristotelian 
or Roman) sort, which relegates materially 
unprivileged individuals to inferior status, 
or of a democratic (Marxian) sort, where all 
should enjoy the material security necessary 
for citizenship. In defending democratic re-
publicanism, Domènech does not share 
Aristotle’s conservative normative position: 
that the property-less, given their incapac-
ity for virtue, should be inferior. But he does 
agree with the related descriptive claim: that 
the possession of property enables the ac-
tual exercise of political rights and freedoms, 
while a lack of property, by forcing social 
dependence, renders them practically inef-
fective.  
 
The French Revolution:  
A Politico-Philosophical Turning Point 
 
For Domènech, liberalism’s theoretical ed-
ifice relies on a denial of the distinction be-
tween persons who are materially dependent 
and independent, which was basic to Greek 
and Roman theories of politics. This liberal 
tradition includes Thatcher, but Domènech 
traces its origins to the years following the 
French Revolution; first, to the Thermido-
rian Reaction of 1794, when mostly prop-
ertied counter-revolutionaries ended the rule 
of Robespierre and, with it, the first, more 
democratic phase of France’s First Repub-
lic (1793-1794); second, to the Directory 
(1795-1799), so named for the five-man ex-
ecutive put in place by the Thermidorians; 
and third, to Napoleon Bonaparte’s coup of 
18 Brumaire (1799)—which ousted the 
Thermidorians—and the Napoleonic Code, 
which became law in 1804.  
Domènech’s analysis of the transition 
from classical Greco-Roman, republican 
to liberal political-philosophical founda-
tions that happened after the French Rev-
olution is crucial for an understanding of 
his republicanism and his critique of lib-
eralism. In short, he tells the story of an 
initial adherence to Greco-Roman pre-
suppositions about the relationship be-
tween wealth and liberty during the First 
Republic’s first, Jacobin phase, and a grad-
ual abandonment of these assumptions. Ul-
timately, the Napoleonic Code collapsed 
the classically republican distinction and 
advanced what Domènech (alluding to free 
Romans’ self-governing, or sui iuris sta-
tus) cleverly called a “fictio iuris” (2004, 
42), a juridical fiction that “broke with the 
republican tradition”—and that would 
reappear in twentieth-century liberal ideas 
of self-ownership, such as Nozick’s—by 
stating that all people, including manual 
laborers, are by definition property-own-
ers, because they own (in Domènech’s 
Marx-inspired phrase) “their labor force” 
(2004, 94-95).9 If, notwithstanding Aris-
totle’s position that they are politically in-
ferior, workers are defined, however mis-
leadingly, as property-owners, then they 
are free, according to republican principles 
and this new liberal framework. To quote 
Domènech’s incredulous summary of this 
conceptual shift, in the new Napoleonic 
order, all persons suddenly became full cit-
izens, because all, even the dispossessed, 
“owned something (namely, their labor 
force),” and so had sufficient “legal ca-
pacity to enter civil society as free persons, 
endowed with their highly peculiar sort of 
‘property’” (2004, 42). 
Domènech shows that, before the con-
solidation of the Thermidorian, Napoleonic, 
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and later liberal juridical fiction, Robespierre 
and the pre-Thermidorian First Republic 
adopted the Greco-Roman dichotomy be-
tween free property-owners and the unfree 
without property, and added to it a demo-
cratic demand that society tend toward a uni-
versalization of propertied status. In a speech 
on food distribution in 1792, Louis Antoine 
de Saint-Just, one of Robespierre’s closest 
allies, implied that one’s not having prop-
erty entailed a social disadvantage (that of 
moral corruption) which governments 
should alleviate, by “lift[ing] the people 
from a corrupting state of uncertainty and 
misery” (in Soboul 62). And when Robe-
spierre said that “no man has a right to amass 
heaps of wheat alongside another man who 
is starving,” he implied that each person’s 
right to a basic level of subsistence takes 
precedence over individuals’ property rights. 
Domènech hears Greco-Roman echoes 
in the words of Robespierre, who under-
stands deprivation as a state in which the 
“man who is starving” is dependent on he 
who might successfully claim “a right to 
amass heaps of wheat.” Robespierre’s re-
sponse to such inequality was, unlike that 
of Aristotle’s conservative republicanism, 
to favor individuals’ increasing material 
independence. For Domènech, the real-
ization of such independence demands the 
elimination of all relationships of domi-
nation, including the public, political 
power of monarchs over subjects and such 
private control as that exercised by patrons 
or patriarchs over employees or depen-
dents. In practical terms, Domènech, as he 
interprets Robespierre, and drawing on a 
conceptual framework borrowed from 
Montesquieu, prescribes a transition from 
a society that is organized vertically (in 
three tiers: political, civil, and familial) 
to another that, having but one tier, is or-
ganized horizontally, removing political 
and familial levels along with the domi-
nation that, in the form of unchecked pow-
ers, is inherent therein.  
In broad terms, pre-French Revolution 
European societies had a generally unri-
valed monarchical power at the top, fol-
lowed by persons who were sui iuris by 
virtue of owning property, but who were 
above those who, without property, had to, 
in Domènech’s words, “depend on others 
to subsist” (2004, 85). Domènech applauds 
Robespierre on two relevant and related 
accounts: first, for calling for the termi-
nation of the first and third tiers, which 
Domènech, using Montesquieu’s original 
French, called, respectively, “loi politique” 
(or state power that is, in Domènech’s 
words, “unbeholden and unaccountable to 
the people”), and “loi de famille” (or the 
private power of employers or domestic 
masters) (2015b, 76).10 In Domènech’s es-
timation, Robespierre’s second praise-
worthy position was for the universaliza-
tion of the second, property-owning tier, 
which, if realized, would make all persons 
citizens in the fullest, republican sense, and 
so, naturally, not subject to an unim-
peachable political law, nor compelled to 
submit to private authority. All would be 
subject to the same ‘loi civile’ (Mon-
tesquieu) and enjoy the same social inde-
pendence and equality typical of Greco-
Roman citizenship. In Domènech’s pithy 
formulation, in the Jacobin program, “ev-
erything is civil society” (2004, 87).  
In a recent, controversial book, James 
Livesey challenges a view held by many, 
including Domènech. He disputes the idea 
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that the Thermidorian overthrow of Robe-
spierre in 1794 was a counter-revolution 
that ended the Revolution’s democratic 
phase and its effective commitment to uni-
versal human rights. Instead, Livesey ar-
gues that the Thermidorians put the Rev-
olution back on a path toward what he 
calls, controversially, “democratic repub-
licanism” (234). Despite Livesey’s sloppy 
use of concepts (e.g. a constitutional order 
devoted explicitly to enshrining property 
rights against the possibility of popular ex-
propriation is not democratic), his position 
is interesting because, if unwittingly, he 
makes one of Domènech’s most important 
points: modern liberalism (of which the 
Directory, by virtually all accounts, is a 
foundational piece) claims unfoundedly to 
be committed to universal freedoms. In 
Livesey’s sympathetic account, the Di-
rectory was committed to “all particular 
freedoms” (234). However, needing in 
practice to privilege the freedom of prop-
ertied elites, the Directory limited that of 
lower classes. Livesey, again unwittingly, 
demonstrates the importance of explain-
ing this contradiction by committing a log-
ical equivocation: “before [Thermidor], Ja-
cobins and sans-culottes had tried, and 
failed, to create a polity in which univer-
sal rights did not corrode all particular 
freedoms” (138). It is unclear what dif-
ferentiates “universal rights” and “all par-
ticular freedoms.” Robespierre and 
Domènech would say nothing does; and if 
they are right, then Livesey’s sentence 
would make more sense if it ended with 
a reference to the corrosion of some par-
ticular freedoms (notably, those of the 
coup’s leaders), not all particular free-
doms.  
Why do Livesey, the Thermidorians, and 
liberals generally, claim to advance freedom 
for all if such a generalized liberty is ap-
parently similar to the universal rights of the 
Jacobins, whom they oppose(d)? One ex-
planation is, as Jon Cowans put it in To 
Speak for the People, that early liberals, to 
protect middle-class economic interests 
against royalists seeking a Bourbon monar-
chical restoration, shrewdly avoided under-
mining the principle of popular sovereignty, 
by coopting from truly popular movements, 
like Robespierre’s, the idea that they rep-
resented the interests of all (155-57). 
Decades earlier, historian Albert Soboul pro-
posed a similar theory: “The Thermidorian 
bourgeoisie could not attack the principle of 
popular sovereignty [. . .] without denying 
its own right to political power and thus 
playing into the hands of the divine right 
monarchists” (147). Understanding them-
selves as champions of the 1789 Declara-
tion of Human Rights, which stated, in ev-
idently universal terms, that “men are born 
and remain legally free and equal,” early lib-
erals, much like liberals today, studiously 
avoided acknowledging that, both in theory 
and reality, they, like monarchists, did not 
defend the interests of all, but only of some.  
So, heeding the call of leading Ther-
midorian François Antoine de Boissy 
d’Anglas’s Preliminary Discourse [Dis-
cours préliminaire], which stated that the 
French people should be “governed by the 
finest”—who were to be found primarily 
among “those who owned property”—and 
which sought the civic exclusion of ma-
terially dependent “men without property” 
(31-34), the Thermidorians simultaneously 
believed that most of France’s inhabi-
tants—including those who either did not 
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own property or earned a salary—were ei-
ther unfit to govern or socially disadvan-
taged, and that, despite such disqualifica-
tions, the French people in general must 
be an essential part of the Republic, lest an 
undermining of the principle of popular 
sovereignty—an essential pillar of the 
Revolution that had enabled their rise to 
power—empower monarchists’ ambitions. 
So the Thermidorians faced a hard politi-
cal theoretical problem: how to incorpo-
rate into the national polity people they 
deemed ill-equipped for political life? In 
a classic article, Lynn Hunt, David Lan-
sky, and Paul Hanson argue that the Di-
rectory’s bourgeois leaders unsurprisingly 
failed to maintain an impossible balance 
between their theoretical commitment 
(consistent with the egalitarian Declara-
tion of 1789) to all people’s right to liberty 
and autonomous rule and their (clearly 
contradictory) determination to exclude 
some people from the sovereign body. On 
several occasions between 1795 and 
Napoleon’s coup in 1799 (notably, the 
coups of 18 Fructidor Year V, Floréal Year 
VI, and Prairial Year VII), influential 
members of France’s bourgeoisie—rec-
ognizing (in the words of Martyn Lyons) 
that “its power base was too narrow to pre-
vent violent fluctuations in the balance of 
power”—resorted to authoritarian asser-
tions of power when they believed that el-
ements of civil society (such as political 
organization or electoral success) threat-
ened their interests (1975, 215).11 In their 
assessment of the Directory, Hunt, et al., 
in agreement with Lyons, make a point that 
is important to Domènech: whatever it 
might defend in theory, economic liber-
alism, which the Directory’s leaders 
sought to implement, has not been com-
mitted to liberty in practice. Considering 
the various bourgeois coups of the late 
1790s, it is clear that, in 1799, when 
Napoleon unilaterally imposed his au-
thority to quiet political agitation, he did 
not deviate from the usual practice of the 
Directory’s bourgeois leaders, who had al-
ready tried several times to consolidate 
power. Napoleon did not betray liberal 
principles, at least not as these principles 
had actually manifested themselves. 
Rather, after several years of the Direc-
tory’s trying to make liberalism prevail in 
France, Napoleon, a military dictator and 
later emperor, became the ultimate repre-
sentative of France’s middle class, or, as 
Hunt, et al. pointedly call him, “the ulti-
mate Director” (759).  
Writing ironically, Domènech summed 
up the Corsican general’s achievement: 
“Napoleon put everything back in its place” 
(2004, 105). Napoleon is the product of the 
bourgeoisie’s refusal to relinquish control 
over Montesquieu’s loi politique, and—re-
calling Henry Heller’s comment on bour-
geois cynicism—“if the price [of control] 
was a more or less unconcealed military dic-
tatorship, so be it” (125). According to 
Domènech, throughout the late-1790s, and 
finally with Napoleon, the bourgeoisie re-
peatedly refused to tolerate left-wing par-
ticipation in the realm of the loi civile. Un-
doing a major element of Robespierre’s 
legacy, the Directory effectively re-sepa-
rated political and civil law, insisting, with 
Pierre Samuel du Pont de Nemours (a mem-
ber of the Directory’s Council of Five Hun-
dred), that only property-owners—or 
“sovereigns by the grace of God”—should 
be entrusted with the responsibility of po-
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litical rule (Du Pont 7). Thus, the middle 
class sought to rule unchallenged, and, in the 
process, created a remarkably unfree polit-
ical landscape. Let us conclude this discus-
sion by bringing together insights from 
Domènech and Hunt, et al. French politi-
cal conditions in the wake of 18 Brumaire 
bore a resemblance to Montesquieu’s multi-
tiered society, particularly in that its exec-
utive power was not subject to popular will. 
In Domènech’s words, executive power was 
separated from civil power, it was “uncivil” 
(2004, 92-93), and civilian power was gov-
erned by a loi politique that was “indepen-
dent of civil society, and more or less im-
possible for civil society to control” (104). 
So, French politics was not an ideally lib-
eral system, which is theoretically commit-
ted to liberty and popular sovereignty. As 
Hunt, et al. put it, France’s propertied elite, 
preferring political power to the natural un-
predictability of democratic government, 
undermined the pillars of liberal govern-
ment: “the legislature was reduced to im-
potence, parties lost their function with the 
abolition of elections, and the executive 
ruled without opposition [. . .] politics per se 
was no longer a viable vocation. [. . .] As a 
consequence, the Revolution’s internal 
mechanism—the mobilization of the polit-
ical classes, however widely or narrowly de-
fined—was finally destroyed” (759).  
Not only did the French revolutionary 
era finally restore a distinction between 
Montesquieu’s loi politique and loi civile. 
According to Domènech, in a further blow 
to Robespierre, it effected a complementary 
separation between loi civile and loi de 
famille. If the bourgeoisie, in the interest of 
the coherence of its position, needed to be 
faithful to the principle of civil equality, on 
which its stance against legal privilege de-
pended, then all persons—including, of 
course, the property-less non-bourgeois—
had to be incorporated on some kind of egal-
itarian footing into any post-revolutionary 
society. Indeed, Montesquieu’s loi civile had 
to be universalized. However, such a move 
was inconceivable, lest what Louis-
Sébastien Mercier (a member of the Direc-
tory’s legislature) called “vile sans-culot-
tisme” gain political ascendance (in Lefeb-
vre 1951, 213). In his classic biography of 
Napoleon, George Lefebvre described the 
bourgeoisie’s dilemma: “the Revolution” 
and “bourgeois ideals” were, at once, com-
patible and incompatible. They were com-
patible in that the revolutionary principle of 
civil equality justified the third estate’s em-
powerment at the expense of the first (royal) 
and second (clerical) estates, but they were 
incompatible, because “bourgeois ideals,” 
particularly those regarding the inviolabil-
ity of private property, could not counte-
nance some of the political demands—such 
as greater material equality—of certain sec-
tors of civil society, particularly the sans-cu-
lottes (2010, 6). In short, the bourgeoisie had 
to confront the fact that, for better and for 
worse, “the Revolution [. . .] remained a rev-
olution of civil equality”; not only the mid-
dle classes would want to benefit from the 
new political era it had ushered in. 
Drawing on Marx, Domènech argues 
that early liberalism, which received legal 
expression in Napoleon’s Code Civil 
(1804), effectively resolved this dilemma in 
two complementary ways. First, it ac-
knowledged the equal rights of all men to 
enter contracts, regardless of material in-
equalities, or of whether, as Marx wrote, the 
only good one could exchange was one’s 
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“labor force.” So, a kind of loi civile was 
extended to all men. But by recognizing not 
a (Jacobin) right to material equality, but a 
nearly absolute right to private property, the 
Code effectively ensured that contracting 
parties would encounter each other in eco-
nomically unequal conditions. According to 
Domènech, the Revolution’s expressed 
ideal of equality was thus only “disingenu-
ously fulfilled,” as it fostered conditions fa-
vorable to social dependence (and therefore 
inequality), where the economically weak 
relied on the powerful for their livelihood 
(2004, 108). From Aristotle to Montesquieu, 
one reads that social dependence and eco-
nomic inferiority, by impeding one’s effec-
tive access to the citizenry, make impossible 
the practical exercise of citizenship. In 
Domènech’s words, Napoleon’s Code “de-
cisively loosened the knot” that, during 
some two millennia in Western philosophy, 
“inextricably linked [. . .] the concept of free 
personhood to the social institution of prop-
erty” (2004, 42). Far from a sincere effort 
to extend equality to all people, the Code, 
by making the poor compete with the rich as 
theoretical equals, effectively enacted what 
Domènech, still borrowing from Mon-
tesquieu, called a “new loi de famille,” or a 
new legal framework for private relations—
which included, most importantly, the work-
place—where those with fewer resources 
are compelled to subject themselves to the 
wealthy (2004, 96). Contrary to the Code’s 
assertion of civic equality, the existence of 
what amounted to a new family sphere, 
which tolerated private domination, was, in 
Domènech’s scheme, “uncivil,” or uncivi-
lized. It was, in other words, the opposite of 
Domènech’s ideal Jacobin republic, where, 
as we have seen, “everything is civil soci-
ety,” or where power relations are not or-
ganized vertically, but horizontally into a 
single loi civile. Domènech rejected this 
Napoleonic innovation, whereby socially 
dependent and economically inferior per-
sons are not told—harshly but honestly—
that they are unworthy of complete civic 
recognition, but, falsely, that they are full 
and equal members of civil society.  
The Code was thus only a partial con-
cession from the bourgeoisie to less privi-
leged classes, resolving the dilemma be-
tween conservative economic interests and 
the radical implications of the Revolution’s 
ideals so that the former received more care-
ful attention. In a speech to the Conseil d’É-
tat that would become, with Napoleon’s au-
thorization, the official version of the Code’s 
history, Jean Portalis outlined the new doc-
ument’s provisions. In a tradition that in-
cluded Boissy’s Thermidorian-era statement 
that “civil equality” was “all a reasonable 
person can demand,” Portalis, referring 
transparently to the presumably unreason-
able expectation that, following the Revo-
lution, equality would extend beyond that 
of social rank, chastised the “license” of 
those who, amid past tumult, had wanted 
to “equalize all fortunes” (299-300). He ex-
tolled the “more moderate ideas” of the 
Code, which sought only to “equalize social 
ranks.” As historian Ellen Meiksins Wood 
summed up this sort of post-Brumaire po-
litical moderation, citizenship—which was 
no longer associated with any tangible ad-
vantage (such as property)—would now 
only guarantee a formal equality of social 
standing. Recalling the bourgeois dilemma 
outlined by Lefebvre, we can make sense of 
one of Meiksins Wood’s conclusions: “If the 
extent of the citizen body could no longer 
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be restricted, the scope of citizenship could 
now be narrowly contained” (1995, 203).  
Domènech dwells on the politics of 
revolutionary France because he saw in its 
ebb and flow—or what British Marxist 
historian Eric Hobsbawm called its “dra-
matic dialectical dance” of popular de-
mands and countervailing impositions of 
order—a pattern that would recur repeat-
edly in the future (62). In the light of Ther-
midor and Napoleon, as Hobsbawn wrote 
in his Age of Revolution, “the main shape 
of French and all subsequent bourgeois 
revolutionary politics were [. . .] clearly 
visible.” For Domènech, up to and in-
cluding contemporary neoliberalism—or, 
the late twentieth century’s revival of the-
oretical tenets of classical, laissez-faire lib-
eralism—Thermidor has shown liberals 
how to appear to uphold individual free-
dom and rights, as they illiberally suppress 
them to secure class privilege. So liberals 
have contributed not to a horizontally-
structured society—toward which politi-
cal life should logically tend in the mod-
ern world, one of whose foundational 
events was the French Revolution’s suc-
cessful challenge to legal privilege—but 
to a society that is organized vertically, 
where, as Domènech describes it, one finds 
(1) a consolidated loi politique at the top, 
where propertied classes wield power dis-
proportionately, (2) a loi civile that effec-
tively allows the perpetuation of inequal-
ity and complicates demands for 
egalitarian reform, and (3) many people 
who are members of this loi civile in the-
ory, but are in effect subject to Domènech’s 
“new loi de famille,” because their mate-
rial dependence exposes them to diverse 
forms of private domination. 
Neoliberalism: “An Unacknowledged 
Policy Regime” 
 
Neoliberalism is a policy model that trans-
fers control of economic factors from the 
public to the private sector, shrinking the 
power of states and facilitating “the exten-
sion of competitive markets into all areas of 
life” (Springer 2). Neoliberals’ expressed 
opposition to illiberalism notwithstanding, 
unless privatization happens spontaneously, 
neoliberalism must rely illiberally on states 
to generalize and enforce the de-politiciza-
tion of civil society. The claim that a kinship 
exists between neoliberalism (or market 
capitalism) and any sort of illiberal political 
theory is at odds with a popular, but mis-
leading notion—advanced by neoliberals 
themselves—that neoliberalism is a theory 
of minimally-interventionist government 
and high degrees of individual liberty—a 
definition that fails accurately to describe 
what Loïc Wacquant calls “[actually exist-
ing neoliberalism]” (2012). In practice, mar-
ket capitalists have demonstrated that the 
actual process of privatization demands not 
a minimal state, but, borrowing a term from 
the consciously illiberal political theorist 
Carl Schmitt, a “very strong state” (or what 
Domènech called, perhaps hyperbolically, 
“[a totalitarianism]”) that actively works 
with capitalists through pro-business legis-
lation or, more perniciously from an anti-ne-
oliberal perspective, the establishment of 
(state or supra-state) institutions, such as 
the U.S. Federal Reserve, the European 
Central Bank, or the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), that, without having to answer 
to public opinion, can grant legal privilege 
to powerful market actors (in Cristi 221; 
Domènech 2005, 334-35).12 So, as Marco 
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Briziarelli has argued, under neoliberalism, 
capitalist classes, effectively rejecting lais-
sez-faire, do not seek to be left alone by the 
state, but to “instrumentalize” it as part of a 
“state-centric class project” to foster opti-
mum conditions for their private economic 
activity (6).  
Like Briziarelli, Domènech argues 
that, despite rhetoric in favor of the dis-
empowerment of governments and self-
regulation of markets, the idea that market 
capitalism has been accompanied by a re-
treat of state power masks the reality that, 
in Europe and the United States since at 
least the 1970s, markets have been “deeply 
regulated,” shaped by state policies de-
signed to strengthen the positions of par-
ticular market agents (e.g. private investors 
and major employers [2010, 59]). Illus-
trating this point, David Harvey’s Brief 
History of Neoliberalism points (1) to so 
called revolving doors, whereby unelected 
private interests (including, as Domènech 
specifies, “people from Goldman Sachs 
[and] the private banking industry”) move 
in and out of government, presumably self-
servingly influencing legislation, and gen-
erating what Domènech called an “inva-
sive influence of plutocrats in political 
life” (2015b, 121; 2002, 42); (2) to the pro-
hibitive costs for most of accessing civil 
courts, which make “class bias in decision-
making within the judiciary [. . .] perva-
sive if not assured”; and (3) laws, such as 
those restricting picketing, that effectively 
frustrate labor’s organization (78). Harvey 
finally concludes that, despite its rhetoric 
about privatization, “neoliberalism does 
not make the state or particular institutions 
of the state [. . .] irrelevant,” but demands 
“a radical reconfiguration of state institu-
tions and practices.” Similarly, Tayyab 
Mahmud has argued that “neoliberalism 
did not displace the state as much as it re-
formulated it,” citing how states have 
tipped the (theoretically competitive) play-
ing field toward the wealthy, actively (and 
illiberally) skewing market competition, 
by contributing (1) to lower real wages 
(through the manipulation of money sup-
plies), (2) to higher private debt (through 
the adjustment of interest rates and infla-
tion of asset values), and, consequently, (3) 
to workers’ weaker negotiating power rel-
ative to employers (13).  
Like Mahmud, Domènech identifies 
the manipulation of wages and credit as an 
example of states’ acting as “instruments” 
(Briziarelli) of private interests, and thus 
also, in a practical contradiction of ne-
oliberal theory, of their illiberally impos-
ing an economic design on civil society. 
For Domènech, such a forceful imposition 
became politically necessary as neoliber-
alism, a pro-business theory, replaced Key-
nesianism—which addressed more di-
rectly workers’ concerns such as wage 
increases—as the economic paradigm in 
Europe and the United States during the 
second half of the twentieth century. The 
de facto post-war economic theory, Key-
nesianism was, in effect, a compromise be-
tween employers and workers, whereby 
the former allowed for better labor con-
ditions (e.g. by agreeing to stricter gov-
ernmental regulation of private enterprise 
and higher real wages for workers) and the 
latter (some revolutionary elements of 
which historically had resisted capitalism) 
gained a stake in the market economy. In 
the later transition from Keynesianism to 
neoliberalism, which marked the end of 
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this compromise, neoliberalism’s propo-
nents, while seeking to reduce workers’ 
(naturally profit-draining) earnings and so-
cial protections, could nonetheless not al-
low purchasing power to fall in a way that 
might provoke the opposition of workers, 
who, enjoying unprecedented prosperity 
under the Keynesian compromise, were 
largely content. The solution—or, as 
Domènech more critically called it, “the 
trick”—was to facilitate workers’ access 
to credit, enabling them, despite falling 
wages and rising job insecurity, to main-
tain high levels of consumption (2015a, 
par. 43). As Colin Crouch has written, the 
establishment of “credit markets for poor 
and middle-class people”—whereby “in-
stead of government taking on debt to 
stimulate the economy, individuals did 
so”—served to “rescue the neo-liberal 
model from the instability that would oth-
erwise have been its fate” (390).  
For Domènech, by putting interest-
generating debt in the place of wage in-
come, this solution was both obviously 
less financially stable and, in conceptual 
terms, perhaps the clearest example of ne-
oliberalism’s practically disproving its as-
sumed liberal foundations. Committed in 
theory to minimal government interven-
tion in the economy, neoliberalism is, nat-
urally, also committed to supply-side eco-
nomics: the stimulation of economic 
growth through the government’s with-
drawing from the economy, lowering taxes 
and loosening regulations for entities, like 
businesses, that supply commodities. 
However, neoliberalism’s encouragement 
of private debt is a tacit recognition that 
demand also must be managed, or that the 
neoliberal economy must resort to (inter-
ventionist and, ironically, Keynesian) de-
mand-side economics: the stimulation of 
economic growth by encouraging demand 
for commodities. More than merely con-
tradictory or ironic, however, by relying 
on debt to stimulate consumption, neolib-
eralism—or as Crouch cuttingly quipped, 
“privatized Keynesianism”—implicitly 
acknowledges that sweeping economic 
liberalization causes relative poverty 
(2009, 382). As Domènech reminds us, ne-
oliberalism’s response to poverty, “against 
all the assertions of ‘neoliberal’ propa-
ganda,” is not liberal at all, but relies on 
a state that is “able to intervene adminis-
tratively on a grand scale,” erecting what 
Crouch further called neoliberalism’s “un-
acknowledged policy regime,” which fu-
els debt-driven consumption to perpetuate 
the system (2015a, par. 43; 2013a, par. 12).  
In his discussions of neoliberalism, 
Domènech stresses that such self-pro-
claimed proponents of modernity’s (or the 
Enlightenment’s) ideal of a civil society of 
free individuals fail to fulfill this promise. 
Despite their rhetoric, they are what Marx 
once called the “opponents [of freedom],” 
who speak of freedom “while combating 
its reality,” “want[ing] to appropriate for 
themselves as a most precious ornament 
what they have rejected as an ornament 
of human nature” (1974, 23). They com-
bat not freedom itself, but, again quoting 
Marx, “the freedom of others,” making it 
“a special privilege,” not “a universal 
right.” Determined, in Domènech’s view, 
to “put the brakes on democracy” as a 
threat to their political power, they have 
acted not as true proponents, or “heirs of 
the Enlightenment,” but rather, “twisting 
and betraying it,” they have become, as 
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Domènech sarcastically remarked, the En-
lightenment’s “[amenders]” (2006a, 357; 
López 287). By variously rationalizing the 
unjust (and remarkably un-enlightened, 
because irrational) power of one part of so-
ciety over another—in the form of a fi-
nancialized technocracy, which, through 
un-elected institutions, can muffle popu-
lar majorities—they have been faithless to 
the Enlightenment project.  
 
Universal Basic Income, or the  
Freedom to Live without Permission 
 
To secure the freedom that the liberal tra-
dition has promised but not actualized, 
Domènech (arguing on republican 
grounds in collaboration with Raventós), 
strongly defended (as “one of the most 
interesting ideas for the left in recent 
years”) a universal basic income (UBI) 
(Suárez and Domènech 2005, par. 22). 
Domènech defined UBI as a proposal that, 
(1) by guaranteeing “a basic citizens’ in-
come, which ensures minimum conditions 
of social existence [or] of material auton-
omy,” aims to achieve the material secu-
rity (and, with it, the republican liberty, as 
defined from Aristotle to Boissy) of those 
who are insufficiently able to access the 
capital that, in a capitalist economy, is 
necessary for prosperity, and (2) applies 
not to specific social categories, but 
equally “to all society’s members, simply 
by virtue of their being such” (2006b, 
295). For Domènech, a UBI would effec-
tively fulfill a traditional promise of re-
publican democracy: that all people might 
live without depending on anyone else. 
Suggesting that a UBI would be a modern-
day version of fifth-century-Athens’ mis-
thon, a salary for the lowest class of citi-
zens—the thetes—intended to enable their 
civic participation, Domènech looked for-
ward, analogously, to the UBI’s ensuring 
that today’s thetes—the poor—“might not 
need to ask anyone’s permission to exist in 
society” (2013b, 20).13 
To be sure, although Domènech con-
sidered UBI to be a politically ambitious 
counterbalance to the capitalist status quo, 
he saw it not as a radical, revolutionary 
break with capitalism that would, as Marx 
envisioned, “radically transform the [cap-
italist] mode of production” (Domènech 
and Raventós 2004). Rather, limited to the 
provision of economic security under cap-
italism, the UBI would be, at its most rad-
ical, in the words of two great advocates, 
Robert van der Veen and Philippe van Par-
ijs, “a capitalist road to communism,” 
where “communism” refers not to histor-
ical examples of collectivist state bureau-
cracies (the Soviet Union) and autocracies 
(North Korea), but, however vaguely, to 
Marx’s definition of communism in The 
Critique of the Gotha Program, as the con-
sciously non-capitalistic distribution of 
economic goods “to each according to his 
needs” (1994, 635). If UBI’s aim resem-
bles Marx’s vision of material equality in 
this particular case, however, the UBI still 
departs from Marx, by repeating what 
Charles Fourier—one of the allegedly 
oversentimental “utopian socialists” lam-
basted in The Communist Manifesto—laid 
out in his Theory of Universal Unity as a 
necessary condition of an ideal society: “in 
this new order the common people must 
enjoy a guarantee of well-being, a mini-
mum income sufficient for present and fu-
ture needs,” a “guarantee [that] must free 
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them from all anxiety either for their own 
welfare or that of their dependents” (in 
Beecher 278). The UBI hews closer to this 
sort of moral enjoinder and to Fourier’s 
idealistic plea for Universal Unity than to 
Marx and Engels’s uncompromisingly sci-
entific socialism, which referred less to 
morality than to historical processes that, 
regardless of ethics, would lead to a com-
munist society.  
To say nothing of communism or Marx, 
however, the UBI’s attention to the social 
implications (for citizenship, for example) 
of the economic security or the material 
autonomy of individuals makes it obvious-
ly akin, and for Domènech, “inextricably 
linked” to republicanism, at least as repub-
licanism has been defined in this article: as 
that tradition for which, as Domènech and 
Raventós remind us, “freedom actually 
derives from property [or] from the mate-
rial independence of individuals.” So, 
Domènech’s support of a UBI, thus 
informed by his concern for (a republican 
kind of) individual liberty as material self-
sufficiency, recalls one of this article’s main 
claims: that Domènech repudiates the 
widespread notion that liberal, free market 
capitalism should be attractive to those for 
whom political liberty is a primary political 
value. Domènech always assumed a repub-
lican definition of liberty as possessing suf-
ficient means for social independence, or, 
as in his definition of UBI, as having “min-
imum conditions of social existence,” and 
therefore thought it unconvincing to claim 
that liberal capitalism—a system that is 
possible only if some people do not have 
access to the most meaningful form of 
security; i.e. capital—is supportive of free-
dom. For Domènech, anyone committed to 
individual freedom should be a republican, 
not a liberal.  
Lest Domènech’s anti-capitalism be un-
derstood as unremarkable, because typical, 
left-wing dogma, it is instructive to con-
sider, as Domènech does, that, in addition 
to the conceptual critique that capitalism is 
inimical to the freedom of individuals with-
out capital, the idea that capitalism threatens 
the freedom of the economically disadvan-
taged has been considered seriously by (1) 
right-wing thinkers, and acknowledged 
straightforwardly by (2) powerful business 
leaders, who think that unprecedented de-
grees of inequality (and so of effective so-
cio-political irrelevance) will obtain in the 
near future. Right-wing thinkers such as lib-
ertarian Charles Murray argued in the 1980s 
that, in terms of freedom and socio-eco-
nomic opportunity, the poor were Losing 
Ground in America’s economy, and faced 
the following “Hobbesian state of affairs,” 
a nasty, brutish situation where “the tangi-
ble incentives that any society can realisti-
cally hold out to the poor youth of average 
abilities and average industriousness are 
mostly penalties, mostly disincentives,” 
where the poor are told: “do not study, 
and we will throw you out; commit crimes, 
and we will put you in jail; do not work, and 
we will make sure that your existence is so 
uncomfortable that any job will be prefer-
able to it” (177). Also, for many years, and 
at least since a 1995 meeting of world 
business leaders in San Francisco’s Fair-
mont Hotel (USA), the world’s economic 
elites have transparently admitted that, 
given technological advances, human so-
ciety will tend to need a smaller percent-
age of its members to make the global 
economy function, rendering a growing 
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percentage of persons economically ob-
solete—which obsolescence, in order to 
prevent an economically irrelevant ma-
jority from toppling the system, will pre-
dictably necessitate the curtailment of 
their opportunities to exercise political 
freedoms. In 1995 in San Francisco, fa-
mously, a ratio of 20% (useful) to 80% 
(useless) was discussed.14 
Admittedly, the ideas of Murray and 
the Fairmont conference do not detract 
from the received notion that liberal, free 
market capitalism generally advances in-
dividual freedom. However, Domènech, 
ever the historically informed thinker, re-
minds us that Western economic elites 
used to admit more candidly that the pre-
vailing economic system—based on pri-
vate ownership of the means of produc-
tion—was likely to appeal only to the 
wealthy, as it structurally relegated the 
property-less to second-class status. How-
ever, in the case of Du Pont de Nemours, 
whom we met in a previous section of this 
article, perhaps it was not candor, but self-
interest that—as he attempted to justify a 
tax-based electorate after the Thermido-
rian Reaction—motivated him to reveal 
abiding truths about the systemic depen-
dence, or the un-freedom of the poor in 
capitalist economies. According to Du 
Pont, property-owners deserved special 
political rights (e.g. voting rights) as ex-
clusive “sovereigns by the grace of 
God”—a position they held, as he tellingly 
put it, because, having control over the 
economic levers of power, they could 
withhold from the rest of the population 
their permission, or “consent” to access vi-
tal resources, including shelter and food 
(7). In the light of Du Pont’s words, Marx 
clearly did not advance a distinctively rad-
ical impeachment of class-based injustice 
when he wrote, many decades after Ther-
midor, that “the man who possesses no 
other property than his labor power must, 
in all conditions of society and culture, be 
the slave of other men who have made 
themselves the owners of the material con-
ditions of labor,” and that this man “can 
only work with their permission, hence 
live only with their permission” (1994, 
316). Marx seems, rather, to be advanc-
ing a reasonably consensual inter-class in-
terpretation of social relations. In this re-
gard, following Marx, and, if a bit more 
circuitously, Du Pont, Domènech would 
have us reject the idea that liberal capi-
talism is a theory about freedom, or at least 
about freedom for all. Instead, with the al-
lusion to Marx that served as the title of 
the journal he edited until his death, 
Domènech urged his readers to embrace 
a proposal, the UBI, that would guaran-
tee to all a degree of material security –or 
republican liberty– such that they could 
live not, as Marx feared, “only with [the] 
permission” of “the owners of the material 
conditions of labor,” but without the per-
mission of any social better –that is, “Sin 
Permiso.” 
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NOTAS
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all transla-
tions are mine. 
2 Bartrina’s original line in Spanish was: “y 
si habla mal de España, es español.” Here I 
allude to Domènech’s most important book, El 
eclipse de la fraternidad (2004). 
3 In 2018, the Spanish philosophical jour-
nal Daimon published an issue centered on the 
concept of fraternity, wherein a minority of 
contributors acknowledge Domènech’s essen-
tial relevance to any discussion of this topic—
e.g. Vergés Gifra assumes Domènech’s diag-
nosis of fraternity’s decline, although, by 
defining fraternity as a subjective, interperso-
nal “attitude” or “disposition,” he ends up im-
plicitly disputing Domènech’s position that 
fraternity means a legal guarantee that all citi-
zens should be materially independent and, as 
such, never subject to domination (2018, 136-
37). Muinelo Paz, for his part, follows Domè-
nech more closely, drawing from Domènech’s 
conceptual analysis of fraternity to shine con-
ceptual light on the political positions on the 
First International and what he calls Marx’s 
“republican turn” (2018). However, conside-
ring that Daimon’s issue was thematically or-
ganized around the same concept, fraternity, as 
the most important essay of such a towering in-
tellectual figure as Domènech, it is remarkable 
that most of its contributions do not mention 
him, excepting the aforementioned, together 
with Bertomeu’s posthumous tribute—which 
reminds readers that Domènech’s work “has 
opened a broad conceptual pathway” for future 
research (2018, 11)—and Puyol’s cogent, but 
necessarily cursory introduction—which prai-
ses Domènech as “the [Spanish] philosopher 
who has done most to analyze and reclaim the 
political concept of fraternity” (2018, 5).
4 I prefer to cite Domènech’s original 2004 
edition of El eclipse de la fraternidad. The 
more recent edition (2019) has not altered Do-
mènech’s text, save for adding Rendueles’s 
preface and Raventós’s epilogue. 
5 For recent scholarship on Domènech’s 
discussion of the relationship between repu-
blican liberty and economic equality, see Váz-
quez García 2017a and 2017b. Laín also cites 
Domènech, together with other Spanish thin-
kers such as Raventós and David Casassas, as 
a key advocate for the idea that holding pro-
perty is a necessary condition for the reality of 
(republican) liberty (11). However, Laín may 
mislead readers when, in defining republican 
liberty, he jointly references Philip Pettit—
who traces this concept to the first-century-
BCE Republican Rome of Cicero and Livy—
and Domènech—who harkens further to 
Ephialtes’s Athens and Aristotle’s Politics—
without making this crucial distinction. To be 
sure, Mulvad and Stahl establish this contrast 
clearly, coining the label “Barcelona School” to 
refer principally to Domènech, Raventós, Ca-
sassas, and María Julia Bertomeu’s “challenge 
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[to Pettit’s] mainstream neo-republicanism,” 
which consists of the Spanish theorists’ ar-
guing (1) that “the roots of republican thought 
predate the Roman republican and are found in 
the Athenian experience” and, revealing the 
controversial nature of the aforementioned link 
between the security of property-ownership 
and the actual exercise of liberty, (2) that Pet-
tit’s republicanism “is too philosophically abs-
tract and should be analyzed in concrete mate-
rial and institutional terms, related to the 
distribution of property” (594).
6 My reference to Martin Luther is to his 
invitation that each Christian should be firstly 
an “inward man” (12), experiencing the Free-
dom of a Christian insofar as he alone has 
faith in and is justified by Christ.
7 I state here that, in Aristotle’s preferred 
political scheme, the wealthy are the best citi-
zens, although, in Book III of the Politics, 
Aristotle recognizes, if with reservations, that 
“the many, who are not as individuals excellent 
men, nevertheless can, when they have come 
together, be better than the few best people, not 
individually but collectively” (82-83). Aristo-
tle does, however, immediately qualify this 
position: “whether this superiority of the many 
to the few excellent people can exist in the 
case of every people and every multitude is not 
clear [. . .] it is clear that in some of them it can-
not possibly do so” (83). This qualification 
notwithstanding, in a separate passage, Aristo-
tle unequivocally prescribes an inferior status 
for those who, not owning anything themsel-
ves, must work for (and so depend on) others: 
“The best city-state will not confer citizenship 
on vulgar craftsmen” (74). 
8 A relevant distinction in the Institutes of 
the Roman/Byzantine Emperor Justinian is 
made thus: “Some persons are in their own 
power, some are subject to the power of others, 
such as slaves, who are in the power of their 
masters” / “quaedam personae sui iuris sunt, 
quaedam alieno iuri subiectae sunt” (in Tho-
mas I, VI, 1, 36).
9 For Marx on workers owning only their 
“labor force,” see Marx 1976, 273.
10 Domènech draws on Montesquieu’s 
three-tiered conceptual framework—loi politi-
que, loi civile, and loi de famille—not because 
he agrees with his hierarchical vision of so-
ciety, but because he provides a useful des-
criptive tool for analyzing the real distribution 
of social power. Montesquieu does not argue, 
as Robespierre and Domènech do, that these 
three tiers should be reduced to one. Rather, 
like conservative republican predecessors, he 
accepts unequal power distribution, and dis-
cusses proper relationships between social es-
tates. For example, in Book XXVI, Chapter 
XVI of L’esprit des lois, Montesquieu focuses 
on the decisions appropriate, respectively, to 
the “droit politique” (or political law) of the 
state and the “droit civil” (or civil law) of the 
people (54). Those laws which address “the in-
terests of individuals,” (or of full citizens in a 
republican sense) are the proper business of ci-
vil law, while those having to do with “the 
well-being and preservation of the state” are 
properly part of political law (55). As for the 
private “loi de famille,” which concerns the re-
lations between masters and dependents, Mon-
tesquieu is consistent with conservative repu-
blican tradition, which recognizes the authority 
of full, propertied citizens over domestic sub-
ordinates. The latter are not part of, or “in so-
ciety” and, so, “the loi civile does not apply to 
them,” and they are legally under their masters’ 
control (28).
11 Domènech often references the musca-
dins—middle-class gangs in 1790s France, 
who, in François Gendron’s largely dispassio-
nate analysis, “[were] used by the Thermido-
rians to start and sustain reactionary political 
action” (327-28)—believing them to be 
(proto)typical examples of bourgeois violence 
against popular political movements: a pattern 
in European history whereby, Domènech ar-
gues, repression is actively tolerated by go-
vernments, instances of which include twen-
tieth century fascism: “the Italian Fascists 
between 1918-1922, whose punitive criminal 
incursions in ateneos, labor unions, socialist 
and anarchist presses and meeting places, ne-
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arly managed to completely undo workers’ or-
ganization [. . .] and paved the way for Mus-
solini’s March on Rome” (2004, 156).
12 In a 2003 interview with the magazine 
Rebelión, Domènech proposed the democra-
tization of the IMF as a means of reducing the 
problem of unaccountability inherent in this 
and similar supra-state institutions (López 
305-06).
13 Commenting on this aspect of Domè-
nech’s thought, Vázquez García writes: “a 
basic income [is the] veritable equivalent of 
the salary paid for public positions that was 
established in the Athens of Ephialtes” 
(2017b, 154).
14 For a well-known account of this mee-
ting, see Martin and Schumann.
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